NASUWT
The Teachers' Union

SUPPLEMENTARY EVIDENCE

SUBMISSION TO THE SCHOOL TEACHERS' REVIEW BODY DECEMBER 2015

The NASUWT is the largest union representing teachers and headteachers in the UK.

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SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 The NASUWT welcomes the opportunity to submit supplementary evidence to the School Teachers' Review Body (Review Body) to inform its 26th Report.

1.2 Fundamental to the Review Body process is that it is evidence based. It is critical that the integrity of this position is maintained and that the Review Body's recommendations are grounded in evidence.

1.3 Regrettably, hard, objective, substantiated evidence seems to be in short supply in a number of submissions, particularly from Government.

1.4 The NASUWT urges the Review Body not to base its recommendations on assertions and anecdotes, but to follow the evidence.

1.5 In this supplementary evidence, the NASUWT has focused principally on the Government's submission to the Review Body.

1.6 The NASUWT has also included, as signalled in our main evidence submission, additional evidence provided by the University of Warwick and by Incomes Data Research (IDR).

SECTION 2: GOVERNMENT EVIDENCE TO THE REVIEW BODY

2.1 The NASUWT believes that the Government's submission to the Review Body is woefully inadequate. It is largely assertion and anecdote, liberally sprinkled with unfocused data.

2.2 The submission fails to focus on the Review Body's remit, privileges wider economic data from the Treasury, which is of little relevance or assistance to the Review Body, and exposes graphically the weaknesses of the Government's approach to teachers' pay.

The case for pay restraint at the national level

2.3 In the Government's submission on the economic context and outlook for the economy, it states that, '*the UK economy grew faster in 2014 than any other major advanced economy at 3.0%, its best performance since 2006.'* [1]

2.4 The Government's justification for public sector pay restraint has always been the 2008 financial crisis, leading to the contracting of the UK economy. However, in its submission, the Government states that UK GDP is *'now 5.2% above its pre-crisis peak.'* [2] It also states that pay grew by 2.8% in the second quarter of 2015, with private sector pay growing by 2.9% in this quarter.[3]

2.5 It is clear, if these claims are correct, that teachers are unjustly being denied the benefits of a recovery that, by the Government's own admission, they have contributed to as a result of public sector pay restraint from 2010 to 2015.

2.6 Annex A of the Government's submission provides information on the general economic outlook. The data is, however, for the whole of the public sector, rather than specific to the teaching workforce. It is deeply concerning that a Department responsible for the teaching workforce fails to provide relevant data.

2.7 The Government, in its submission, claims that pension provision delivers a substantial premium for public sector workers. The Office of Manpower Economics' (OME) Comparative Valuation of teachers' pension benefits carried out to inform the Review Body's 25th Remit, provides more relevant and focused data on teachers' pensions.

2.8 The OME's Comparative Valuation noted that *'the changes since 2010, particularly in relation to the indexation of pension benefits, have led to a significant reduction in the value of pension benefits provided in the public sector.'*

2.9 The OME's Comparative Valuation also models the impact of teachers' pension reform on four illustrative individuals. For three of these, the net value of pension benefits has fallen at the three valuation dates (percentage of salary, net of employee cost). For all of the illustrative cases, the typical

[1] Government evidence to the STRB, the 2016 pay award, December 2015, A1
[2] Ibid, A10
[3] Ibid, A7

private sector defined benefit scheme gives higher net benefits than those for a teacher, when projected forward to 2016.

2.10 The Government claims that pay flexibilities are used to pay teachers more. Evidence of the impact of pay flexibilities from by the November 2014 School Workforce Census clearly contradicts this.

2.11 The table in Annex 1 of this submission shows that between 2010 and 2014 the number and proportion of:

- unqualified teachers increased by 2,862 (15.3%);
- teachers being paid on the Main Pay Range increased by 23,396 (13.6%);
- teachers being paid on the Upper Pay Range decreased by 5,613 (2.7%);
- teachers on the Advanced Skills Teacher (AST), Excellent Teacher (ET), and Leading Practitioner Pay Ranges decreased by 1,968 (39.1%).

2.12 The evidence confirms that it has become increasingly difficult for classroom teachers to progress onto the upper pay range. The number and proportion of unqualified teachers and teachers on the main pay range has increased during this period.

2.13 In 2013, Advanced Skills Teachers (AST) and Excellent Teachers (ET) posts were removed from the pay structure and the post of Leading Practitioner was created. The purpose of the Leading Practitioner role was to model and lead improvement of teaching skills which was broadly the same purpose served by ASTs and ETs. However, AST and ET post-holders were not assimilated onto the Leading Practitioner pay range and schools were given the discretion to create Leading Practitioner posts in their pay structure.

2.14 The consequence of this was a reduction by approximately two fifths of posts in the transition from AST/ET roles to the Leading Practitioner role.

2.15 Thus the impact was negative, not only on teachers' pay, but also on career options, as another career pathway for classroom teachers was removed. In the case of women on these grades, the reduction in posts has been over two fifths.

2.16 Between 2010 and 2014, there has been a significant 16,608 decrease in the number and proportion of teachers in the 50 to 59 age group being paid on the upper pay range. This represents a 25.8% decrease. The data supports the evidence presented by NASUWT in our main submission, that older and more experienced teachers are victims of widespread discriminatory practice.

Gender pay gap

2.17 The Government claims there is *'high pay for women'* working in the public sector and relates this to narrowing the gender pay gap. The available evidence confirms that any narrowing of the gender pay gap has occurred because of the overall depression of the value of teachers' pay rather than because of the uplifting of women's pay.

2.18 The table in Annex 2 of this submission, using figures provided by the DfE in its School Workforce Census (SWC), shows the mean gross pay of women teachers by age, disability and ethnic group between 2010 and 2014 and mean gross pay of women relative to mean gross pay of men.[4]

2.19 For many of the categories for whom the gender pay gap is widest, the gap has widened further since 2013.

2.20 The evidence in Figure 1 below indicates the extent to which women teachers' pay is lower than their male counterparts by age group and disability from 2010 to 2014.

2.21 Whilst women aged 21 to 29 years earn almost as much as their male counterparts, there is a significant gender pay gap for women in all other age groups and for women teachers with a disability.

2.22 Women aged 40-49 years have the highest gender pay gap of any of the categories and the pay gap is increasing.

2.23 The Government's submission does, however, correctly identify that women remain under-represented in all school leader categories and over-represented in the classroom teacher category[5].

Figure 1: Women teachers pay relative to male (=100) from 2010 to 2014 by age and disability



[4] University of Warwick Institute for Employment Research/NASUWT, to be published in 2016
[5] Government evidence to the STRB, the 2016 pay award, December 2015, C3, Figure 6.

Affordability in schools

2.24 On 10 December 2015, the DfE published local authority and school expenditure on education and children's services [6]. This included the revenue balances held by schools at the end of March 2015.

2.25 The DfE statistics (see Table 1 and Figure 2 below) confirm that maintained school balances have continued to increase, rising on average by £2,491 or 2.12%. From April 2009 to March 2015 school balances increased on average by 56.26% from £76,663 to £119,797.

Table 1

All schools	Total number of schools	Total revenue balance (£,000)	Average revenue balance (£ per school)	Increase in average balance	% Change in average balance	% Change in average balance since 2010
2009-10	21,722	£1,665,279	£76,663			
2010-11	21,567	£1,955,448	£90,669	£14,005	18.27%	
2011-12	20,978	£2,323,533	£110,760	£20,092	22.16%	
2012-13	19,648	£2,224,954	£113,241	£2,480	2.24%	
2013-14	18,403	£2,158,786	£117,306	£4,065	3.59%	
2014-15	17,385	£2,080,960	£119,699	£2,392	3.59%	56.14%

* *These figures do not include pupil referral units*

Figure 2



[6] DfE Schools, education and children's services spending: 2014 to 2015, SR48/15, December 2015: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/schools-education-and-childrens-services-spending-2014-to-2015

2.26 In table 2 below the number of schools in deficit has also fallen from 1,027 in March 2014 to 924 in March 2015. The average surplus, in those schools with a surplus, has also increased.

Table 2

All schools	**Schools in deficit**				**Schools in surplus**			
	Number of schools in deficit	% schools in deficit	Total deficit (£,000)	Average Deficit (£ per school)	Number of schools in surplus	% schools in surplus	Total surplus (£,000)	Average surplus (£ per school)
2009-10	1,968	9.06%	£(161,418)	£(82,021)	19,671	90.56%	£1,826,697	£92,862
2010-11	1,511	7.01%	£(143,478)	£(94,956)	19,930	92.41%	£2,098,926	£105,315
2011-12	1,081	5.15%	£(109,937)	£(101,699)	19,679	93.81%	£2,433,469	£123,658
2012-13	1,111	5.65%	£(81,191)	£(73,079)	18,318	93.23%	£2,306,145	£125,895
2013-14	1,027	5.58%	£(73,152)	£(71,229)	17,192	93.42%	£2,231,938	£129,824
2014-15	924	5.58%	£(100,801)	£(109,092)	16,280	93.42%	£2,181,761	£134,427

2.27 The DfE's SR48 Report on 'Expenditure by Local Authorities and Schools on Education, Children and Young People's Services in England', 2014-15 states that *'at national level, the average 'spend per pupil' figures for local authority maintained schools open through the 2014-15 financial year increased by £155 (from £5,057 in 2013-14)'.* This is an increase of 3.07%.

2.28 The Government claims, in its submission, that the total pay bill for publicly funded schools is £24.2 billion and that a flat 1% pay uplift is estimated to cost a further £245 million. The NASUWT refutes this.

2.29 According to the SR48 Report the total gross expenditure in maintained schools was £28.1 billion, of which £13.0 billion (46.4%) was spent on permanent and supply teaching staff. The effect of a flat 1% pay uplift would, therefore, only amount to approximately £130 million in maintained schools. £245 million would contribute to the costs of an above inflation pay award.

Maintaining a supply of high quality teachers and school leaders

2.30 The Government's submission states that 'w*e recognise that recruitment is particularly challenging in some parts of the country, especially as the economy improves.'* [7]

2.31 In paragraph 23 of its submission, the Government recognises that the teacher supply picture will also become more challenging in future but attempts, without the provision of any supporting evidence, to direct responsibility for this solely to changes in the graduate labour market.

2.32 Teaching competes in a wider graduate labour market and it is the case that issues, such as growth in pupil numbers, create teacher supply challenges. However, the Government's submission ignores the significant weight of evidence of the adverse impact of its own workforce policies on teacher recruitment and retention.

[7] Government evidence to the STRB, the 2016 pay award, December 2015, paragraph 26.

2.33 In paragraph 24, the Government's submission claims that teacher vacancy rates remain low. The NASUWT draws the attention of the Review Body to the following issues:

a) the way in which teacher vacancy rates are recorded was changed by the Coalition Government in 2010, so that the DfE's statistics now exclude vacancies at the end of the autumn term and, thereby, understate the actual level of vacancies; and

b) the current vacancy rate is heading towards levels not experienced since the start of the last decade when, by common consensus, there was a teacher recruitment crisis.

2.34 The Government's submission points to increases in the number of candidates entering teaching with a 2:1 degree or better. The NASUWT addressed this point in its main submission and identified the reasons for this specifically that this was a continuing trend, not the result of any action by the Government.

2.35 In paragraph 24 of its submission, the Government claims a positive impact of bursaries on teacher recruitment in those subjects with the highest bursaries. However, what the Government fails to highlight is that the evidence demonstrates that almost all subjects, that attract relatively high bursaries, have continued to under-recruit.

2.36 In paragraph 26 of its submission, the Government claims that schools are able to use their pay policy flexibilities to address local recruitment and retention issues, but provides no evidence that schools have used these flexibilities positively or as an effective tool for recruitment and retention. The evidence indicates that the extension of pay flexibilities has coincided precisely with the deepening recruitment and retention crisis and that pay flexibilities are being used to depress and to suppress pay, rather than to increase it.

2.37 In paragraph 27 of its submission, the Government highlights the potential of its proposed National Teaching Service to address localised recruitment and retention problems.

2.38 The National Teaching Service at present amounts to no more than a few lines in a DfE press release. Therefore, to seek to claim this will be an effective strategy to address recruitment and retention, when there is no detail of how it will operate, how it will be managed, the terms and conditions of staff or how the DfE intends to recruit these teachers, is risible.

2.39 There was no consultation on the development of the National Teaching Service and there are potential implications for pay and conditions of service. The NASUWT has queried, therefore, with the Secretary of State why it has not been included in a Review Body remit. The NASUWT General Secretary's letter to the Secretary of State is in Annex 3**.** A response has yet to be received.

2.40 It is simply not credible for the Government to present this Service to the Review Body as a strategy to address the current crisis when it is clearly undeveloped, untried and untested. In addition, the original reason given for the establishment of the National Teaching Service by the DfE was to address underperformance. No mention was made of there being any connection with teacher supply until it appeared in the Government's submission to the Review Body. This appears to be a classic case of retro-fitting.

2.41 The Government's submission claims that School Direct is helping schools to meet recruitment issues. However, the evidence summarised in the NASUWT's main submission demonstrates that School Direct programmes continue to miss their recruitment targets. There is no evidence that retention rates for School Direct-trained teachers are likely to be any higher than for the generality of teachers.

2.42 In paragraph 27 of its submission, the Government claims that the expansion of Teach First is part of the solution to recruitment and retention challenges. Teach First, by its own admission, is a very small part of the teacher recruitment landscape.

2.43 In paragraph C25, of Annex C, of its submission the DfE argues that it is confident that vacancy rates are manageable. The evidence set out in the NASUWT's main submission confirms that wastage rates and recruitment levels are approaching those seen during the last teacher supply crisis at the end of the 1990s.

2.44 In paragraphs C28 to C31 of Annex C, of its submission the Government acknowledges that pupil numbers will increase significantly. Evidence from the DfE's statistical data confirms that the increase in pupil numbers has continued to outstrip increases in teacher numbers. In the period 2010 to 2014, the number of classroom teachers increased by 3.3% whilst the number of pupils increased by 4.2%.

2.45 On 8 December, the Minister of State for Schools, Nick Gibb, gave evidence to the House of Commons Education Select Committee as part of its inquiry into the supply of teachers.

2.46 The NASUWT is clear that the Minister's evidence did not acknowledge the extent of the teacher supply problems faced by the education system currently or the steps required to address these problems. In particular, the Union was concerned by the emphasis given by the Minister to the role of bursaries in tackling teacher supply shortages. While the NASUWT does not object in principle to the use of financial incentives to support teacher recruitment, the approach to bursaries in place currently is failing to address the fundamental barriers that exist to securing effective teacher supply.

2.47 As the Union's evidence makes clear, even among subjects attracting the highest bursaries, recruitment figures are falling well below those required to ensure levels of teacher supply identified as sufficient by the DfE's Teacher Supply Model.

2.48 The NASUWT further notes that the Minister's evidence stressed the role of pay flexibilities in allowing schools to address particular teacher supply issues, notwithstanding the shortcomings described in the NASUWT's evidence of this policy as a strategy for securing adequate teacher recruitment and retention.

2.49 However, the Minister's evidence included an explicit recognition of the negative implications of education reform since May 2010 on teacher morale and the implications of this for teacher recruitment and retention.

2.50 The Review Body will note that teacher morale was identified as a significant influencer of teacher recruitment and retention in the NASUWT's evidence.

2.51 The Minister further stated that as a result of these pressures, the Secretary of State will seek to stabilise the system through a reduction in the pace of reform. The NASUWT is clear that while the adoption of a more appropriate timescale for policy reform might be long overdue, existing Government policy will continue to contribute to the teacher supply crisis through its impact on teachers' pay and conditions. It is reform of these policies rather than a slowing in the pace of their implementation that would have the greatest impact on addressing the teacher supply challenges the education system faces currently.

2.52 It is clear from the Minister's appearance at the Select Committee that not only is the Government unable to provide any convincing evidence on teacher supply to the Review Body, it was also unable to make any significant contribution to the Select Committee Inquiry.

Applying the 2016 pay award

2.53 In considering the application of the 2016 pay award, the Review Body needs to consider the lessons to be learned from the application of the 2015 award. In its main submission, the NASUWT drew to the attention of the Review Body the chaos caused by the DfE's September 2015 pay advice to schools and local authorities.

2.54 Further pay advice has now been issued by the DfE (December 2015), again without consultation, and with the section relating to the setting of school leaders' pay removed. This has added to the confusion.

2.55 The NASUWT's main submission provides detailed evidence on implementation and the impact on teachers and schools. The Government asserts that schools are becoming *'increasingly accustomed to, and confident in implementing this approach'* (ie flexibility over the application of the pay award). There is no evidence offered to support this view and if, as the Government suggests, a similar approach is taken by the Review Body for the 2016-17 award, then teachers will continue to face chaos, confusion, unfairness and discrimination, as the evidence on the implementation of the 2015-16 pay award implementation demonstrates.

Additional flexibilities and incentives

2.56 In paragraph 41 of its submission, the Government says that it has '*engaged in recent months in a series of intelligence gathering visits with (sic) schools and local authorities that has (sic) provided valuable feedback on how schools are implementing the reforms.'* The Government fails to provide any evidence of such *'intelligence gathering visits'*. There are no details of how many schools were visited, the types of schools, the questions asked or the information gathered.

2.57 In paragraph 42 of its submission, the Government claims that 'many academies' make non-consolidated payments or pay honoraria in recognition of good performance. Again, no evidence is provided to substantiate this claim.

2.58 In paragraph 45 of its submission, the Government makes a further unsupported claim that non-consolidated payments or honoraria are used widely in the public sector. This claim is made alongside the assertion that *'most headteachers we have spoken to'* have questioned why they are prevented from making use of this flexibility. Again this is anecdotal. There is no information, for example, on numbers of headteachers, types of schools or in what context the comments were allegedly made.

Moving teachers down from upper pay range

2.59 The Government's submission claims that *'another consistent message that we receive from schools, Local Authorities and headteacher unions is that an additional flexibility they would welcome is the capacity for teachers who are currently paid on the upper pay range to revert voluntarily to the main pay range if they no longer wish to perform the additional responsibilities expected of them.'* [8] *T*he submissions made to the Review Body in connection with this aspect of the remit by statutory consultees representing the groups cited by the Government, appear at variance with the claims made in the Government's submission.

2.60 The Government's submission shows a complete lack of understanding of the upper main pay range. The upper pay range is not a pay range for 'additional responsibilities'. The purpose of the upper pay range is to enable teachers to *'focus on their strengths of a classroom teacher'* and to reward teachers who remain committed to the classroom with higher salaries. The concept that a teacher would wish to move down from the upper pay range in order to continuing teaching is nonsensical, and has profound implications for teaching and learning.

2.61 In addition, the Government's presentation of this issue in its submission conflicts with its own advice to schools and local authorities, which states:

'Schools should try to avoid confusing or conflating the criterion and factors for the award of TLR payments with the criteria for movement to the UPR both within the context of objective-setting and when making pay decisions.' [9]

[8] Ibid, paragraph 48.
[9] HR Practice in relation to teachers' pay, March 2015, paragraph 3.

Salary sacrifice arrangements

2.62 In support of salary sacrifice arrangements the Government, in its submission, has drawn to the attention of the Review Body the Department for Communities and Local Government's (DCLG) Rental Deposit Salary Advance Scheme.

2.63 The Government indicates that in the DCLG employees apply for an advance of salary to the cost of a rental deposit, which they then replay through payroll over a period of 12 months. This not salary sacrifice. It is an interest free loan.

2.64 In addition, the DCLG Scheme is a scheme managed for the whole workforce by Government. The Government has not assisted the Review Body by illustrating how the Scheme for teachers would operate. In addition, the exemplar of the DCLG Scheme raises a series of questions, including who would put up the money for the loan if the system were applied to maintained schools, would it be local authorities or individual schools. Left to individual schools, it would be clear that there inevitably would be inequitable access.

2.65 The NASUWT is very clear that an approved salary sacrifice scheme, entered into STPCD provisions, must include the following elements:

- tax relief on the amount which is sacrificed from the teachers' gross salary;
- both employer and employee pension contributions must be paid on the salary before the salary sacrifice sum is deducted;
- it must be managed centrally by the DfE so that it is accessible to all teachers.

2.66 Neither teachers nor the pay system would benefit from another provision which can simply be withheld from teachers at school level.

Welsh Education Workforce Council - registration fee arrangements

2.67 The DfE has cited the Welsh Government's submission on the Education Workforce Council (EWC) registration fee in support of the removal of this provision from the STPCD.

2.68 Both the Welsh and Westminster governments are therefore asking for Review Body to recommend the removal of paragraph 28 from the STPCD.

2.69 Both have referenced a proposed EWC fee model for 2016, which involves teachers paying a £78 fee and other members of the schools' workforce paying a £45 fee.

2.70 It is clear that the Welsh Government still wishes to receive the subsidy from the Westminster Government and use it directly to offset part of the cost of the fee for teachers. However, there is no indication in the Government's submission that if this provision is removed from the STPCD that the money would be provided in the way the Welsh Government envisages. The impact of removing this provision from the STPCD would be to create savings of approximately £1 million, the use of which would be a matter of determination by HM Treasury.

2.71 No evidence has been provided by either government on the impact on teachers in Wales as a result of the removal of this contractual provision but it is clear there would be significant financial implications.

2.72 The Review Body has no authority to remove a financial provision from the STPCD and to recommend to where the money saved can be directed. In these circumstances, the NASUWT maintains that it is for the Welsh and Westminster Governments to reach agreement on the allocation of equivalent funding to Wales and then to approach the Review Body for changes to the STPCD provisions. However, until such time it would be unacceptable for the Review Body to increase the financial pressures on teachers in Wales by recommending the removal of paragraph 28.

2.73 The NASUWT believes that it is vital that the EWC subsidy of £33, as an absolute to minimum, is retained in the STPCD.

SECTION 3: INCOMES DATA RESEARCH REPORT

3.1 In December 2015, IDR published a report into teachers' pay commissioned by the NASUWT.[10]

3.2 The Report compares teachers' pay with that of other graduate professions and concludes that teachers are regularly positioned at or near the bottom of the pay league compared to ten other occupations.

3.3 The main findings include:

(i) Teachers' pay continues to be profoundly uncompetitive. The median starting rate for graduates for 2015 was £26,500 and the average was £25,222. This is £3,756 and £2,978 higher, respectively, than the minimum point of the pay range for qualified teachers.

(ii) The median rate for graduates after three years is £35,000 and after five years is £38,585. These comparable graduate profession median figures are £7,073 and £5,754 higher, respectively, than the current discretionary pay reference point 4 and the maximum of the main pay range, which a teacher would, at best, be likely to achieve. This modelling assumes that there has been annual pay progression up the discretionary pay reference point spine and that teachers on each pay value other than the maximum of the main pay range received a one per cent pay increase in September 2015, with teachers on the maximum of the main pay range receiving a two per cent increase. The NASUWT's main evidence to the Review Body indicates that this is far from the case for many teachers and that individual teachers' pay will have fallen even further behind that of comparable professionals. This is demonstrated by Figure 3 from the IDR Report.[11]

(iii) In some other key aspects of teachers' pay the picture is also worsening. The IDR has calculated the 2015 median graduate salary is 19% higher than the minimum of the main pay range, which compares with 14% in 2014. In 2014, average basic earnings for all comparator professions were 22.6% ahead of average earnings for primary teachers.

3.4 The Report gives an overview of the current labour market for graduates, showing that it is the most buoyant it has been since before the financial crisis of 2008/09.

3.5 The Report reaches the following conclusion:

'Our conclusion, therefore, is that currently the teaching profession appears relatively unattractive in terms of earnings levels when compared to other graduate occupations. This, together with the recruitment and retention problems evidenced in the 25th STRB Report would suggest that to redress the balance, any review of the national pay framework needs to address the issue of how teachers' earnings compare with those for other graduate professions.'

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[10] A review of school teachers' pay in England and Wales compared with other graduate professions, Mulkearn and Glenn, IDR, December 2015.

[11] A review of school teachers' pay in England and Wales compared with other graduate professions, A Report for NASUWT, IDS, Mulhearn and Glen, graph 1, page 3.

3.6 The full IDR Report is attached in Annex 4.

Figure 3

Indexed average basic earnings lead of all-comparator graduate professions over school teachers: 1998, 2005 and 2014



	1998	2005	2014
School teachers	100.0	100.0	100.0
Average lead of other professions over primary and nursery school teachers	131.5	125.0	122.6
Average lead of other professions over secondary school teachers	122.9	117.6	114.6

Annex 1

Change in number and percentage of teachers by pay scale/range, 2010 to 2014		Change 2010-2014						Percentage (%) change 2010-2014					
		Unqualified Teacher	Main	Upper	AST, ET (up to 2013) Lead Practitioner (2013 onwards)	Leadership	Total	Unqualified Teacher	Main	Upper	AST, ET (up to 2013) Lead Practitioner (2013 onwards)	Leadership	Total
All teachers	**All teachers**	**2,862**	**23,396**	**-5,613**	**-1,968**	**4,809**	**23,486**	**15.3**	**13.6**	**-2.7**	**-39.1**	**7.4**	**5.0**
Gender	**Women**	**2,223**	**18,050**	**-2,364**	**-1,487**	**4,635**	**21,057**	**17.7**	**13.5**	**-1.5**	**-41.2**	**11.0**	**6.0**
	Men	**639**	**5,346**	**-3,249**	**-481**	**174**	**2,429**	**10.5**	**13.8**	**-6.4**	**-33.9**	**0.8**	**2.0**
Age	21-29	2,060	10,929	-761	-149	457	12,536	33.2	12.7	-11.6	-36.0	33.3	12.4
	30-39	475	8,469	4,345	-891	2,896	15,294	11.1	17.6	6.0	-46.2	17.8	10.7
	40-49	-130	2,376	7,655	-376	5,553	15,078	-2.7	9.4	13.2	-29.5	26.8	13.7
	50-59	398	1,448	-16,608	-524	-4,346	-19,632	13.4	13.0	-25.8	-41.4	-18.1	-18.9
	60-64	59	174	-244	-28	249	210	11.4	11.1	-3.1	-18.9	11.1	1.7
Disability	Disabled	31	69	-126	-15	-3	-44	27.9	10.0	-10.3	-44.1	-1.0	-1.9
Ethnicity	White	2,081	16,044	-7,724	-1,856	3,929	12,474	13.5	10.6	-4.0	-40.9	6.5	2.9
	Mixed	165	809	335	-4	155	1,460	73.3	42.8	28.7	-9.8	46.4	39.9
	South Asian	)164	1,238	1,315	-33	377	3,061	21.7	17.4	29.2	-22.4	39.9	22.7
	Black	185	314	137	-29	156	763	29.5	8.6	4.1	-32.6	20.6	9.0
	Other	-13	94	-20	-4	69	126	-3.6	6.7	-1.8	-12.1	35.8	4.1

Key: Figures on a blue background show a negative change between 2010 and 2014.

Annex 2

Key: Figures on a pale yellow background indicate where women teachers earn less than their male counterparts

TABLE 1 **Gender Pay Gap, 2010 to 2014**		**Mean gross pay (£)**					**Female relative to male (=100)**				
		2010	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**	**2014**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**	**2014**
Female Teachers	**All Female**	**32,533**	**32,532**	**32,238**	**32,588**	**32,671**	**84.9**	**85.1**	**85.3**	**85.1**	**85.4**
Age	21-29	38,514	38,641	38,654	41,353	39,910	98.8	99.8	100.1	99.8	99.97
	30-39	41,846	41,896	41,737	42,583	42,942	84.4	85.0	85.4	85.4	86.0
	40-49	41,712	41,507	41,651	42,343	43,296	80.4	80.1	80.1	79.8	79.8
	50-59	36,322	36,739	36,050	37,033	36,753	85.0	85.0	85.0	84.8	84.7
	60-64	37,768	37,777	37,638	38,331	37,806	93.1	91.7	91.9	90.8	93.7
Disability	Disabled	35,313	35,337	33,820	34,302	34,492	88.9	88.7	88.2	90.7	91.1
Ethnicity	White British	35,529	35,646	35,592	36,262	36,203	84.2	84.4	84.6	84.3	84.6
	White Irish	35,114	35,100	34,691	35,404	34,672	88.7	89.1	88.9	89.4	90.9
	Any Other White Background	35,133	34,997	35,352	35,016	40,481	88.0	87.1	86.8	87.4	87.9
	White and Black Caribbean	34,783	34,787	34,367	34,480	35,186	93.7	92.0	96.1	98.1	96.1
	White and Black African	35,510	35,664	35,187	35,275	35,796	92.5	92.6	93.0	92.4	95.3
	White and Asian	35,384	35,680	35,706	36,239	36,673	88.2	88.5	88.9	88.0	88.4
	Any Other Mixed Background	33,068	33,729	33,447	33,783	33,963	89.6	89.9	89.0	91.1	93.4
	Indian	33,514	34,254	33,835	33,976	34,101	87.7	87.6	88.6	87.1	87.8
	Pakistani	35,270	35,917	42,805	36,183	35,810	88.0	89.2	88.0	86.6	88.1
	Bangladeshi	37,175	37,613	37,165	38,204	37,469	88.6	88.9	85.9	86.1	85.6
	Any Other Asian Background	39,649	39,894	39,566	40,260	40,340	92.4	91.9	94.7	94.4	92.2
	Black African	37,852	37,713	38,584	38,003	38,800	100.0	99.8	99.1	99.7	97.2
	Black Caribbean	32,926	33,285	33,062	33,829	33,398	101.2	101.7	101.0	99.3	100.6
	Any Other Black Background	36,174	36,398	36,225	36,022	37,742	99.5	97.4	97.9	95.5	95.7
	Chinese	35,696	35,734	35,431	35,912	36,796	90.4	90.7	87.5	88.9	87.0
	Any Other Ethnic Group	27,939	27,570	27,064	27,547	27,307	89.4	89.6	87.4	87.6	89.7

Date: 19 November 2015
Your Ref:
Our Ref: 151119/Morgan N/CK/DL

NASUWT
The Teachers' Union

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Rt Hon Nicky Morgan MP
Secretary of State
Department for Education
Sanctuary Buildings
Great Smith Street
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Dear Nicky

National Teaching Service

I write with regard to the announcement you made on 3rd November 2015, regarding the introduction of a National Teaching Service. It is disappointing that in the context of the seemingly positive statements you have made that you wish to engage with trade unions representing the teaching profession that you failed to consult with the NASUWT on this initiative. It is impossible to instil confidence in the Government's approach among the many thousands of teachers and school leaders I represent when major decisions are made without reference to those they elect to represent them.

I would be grateful if you would advise me of the names of the individuals who were consulted on this initiative prior to the announcement on the 3rd November 2015 and the organisations to which they belong. I would also welcome being provided with details of how the consultations took place, including the dates, notes and/or minutes of any meetings held.

I hope that there will be no problem in providing this information but for the avoidance of doubt this request is made in accordance with the provision of the Freedom of Information Act.

It is clear from the announcement that there are issues relating to the pay and conditions of service of not only those who will be working within the Service but for teachers who are employed under the provisions of the School Teachers' Pay and Conditions Document. Although no details of the pay and conditions of service have been provided it is clear from the information in the DfE announcement made on 3rd November that there are matters under consideration which may vary current provisions.

The NASUWT believes that these matters should, therefore, be considered by the School Teachers' Review Body.

The largest teachers' union in the UK

In my recent meeting with Nick Gibb, I requested the opportunity to discuss the National Teaching Service with officials and I appreciate that he agreed that could take place. However, the matter of reference to the School Teachers' Review Body still remains.

I would welcome confirmation that you intend to provide, in the near, future a remit to the School Teachers' Review Body on this matter, which would then provide the opportunity for the experience and expertise of the NASUWT and a range of other statutory consultees to be considered to help to ensure that no unforeseen anomalies occur in the implementation of this new Service.

I have already written to the Dr Patricia Rice Chair of the School Teachers' Review Body alerting her to this issue.

Thanking you in anticipation of a positive response.

Best wishes.

Yours sincerely

Chris.

Chris Keates (Ms)
General Secretary